Abstract. In this paper, we propose a Directed threshold multisignature scheme without SDC. This signature scheme is applicable when the message is sensitive to the signature receiver; and the signatures are generated by the cooperation of a number of people from a given group of senders. In this scheme, any malicious set of signers cannot impersonate any other set of signers to forge the signatures. In case of forgery, it is possible to trace the signing set.
Introduction
Digital signature is a cryptographic tool to authenticate electronic communications. Digital signature scheme allows a user with a public key and a corresponding private key to sign a document in such a way that anyone can verify the signature on the document (using her/his public key), but no one can forge the signature on any other document. This self-authentication is required for some applications of digital signatures such as certification by some authority.
In most situations, the signer is generally a single person. However, in some cases the message is sent by one organization and requires the approval or consent of several people. In these cases, the signature generation is done by more than one consenting person. A common example of this policy is a large bank transaction, by one organization, which requires the signature of more than one partner. Such a policy could be implemented by having a separate digital signature for every required signer, but this solution increases the effort to verify the message linearly with the number of signer. To solve this problems, Multisignature schemes [10, 11, 13, 17, 18] and threshold signature schemes [5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 20] are used where more than one signers share the responsibility of signing messages Threshold signatures are closely related to the concept of threshold cryptography, first introduced by Desmedt [5, 6, 7] . In 1991, Desmedt and Frankel [6] proposed the first (t, n) threshold digital signature scheme based on the RSA system. In (t, n) threshold signature scheme, any subgroup of t or more shareholders of the designated group can generate a valid group signature in such a way that the verifier can check the validity of the signature without identifying the identities of the signers. In threshold schemes, when any t or more shareholders act in collusion, they can impersonate any other set of shareholders to forge the signatures. In this case, the malicious set of signers does not have any responsibility for the signatures and it is impossible to trace the signers. Unfortunately, with threshold schemes proposed so far, this problem cannot be solved.
In multisignature schemes, the signers of a multisignature are identified in the beginning and the validity of the multisignature has to be verified with the help of identities of the signers. For multisignature, it is indeed unnecessary to put a threshold value to restrict the number of signers.
Consider the situation, where a group of anonymous members would have to generate a multisignature.
The members of this group use pseudonyms as their identities in the public directory. What concerns the verifier most is that at least t members sign a message and they indeed come from that group.
Nevertheless, the verifier has no way to verify whether a user is in fact a member of that group because of the anonymity of the membership. In this case, the multisignature schemes cannot solve this problems, however, the threshold signature schemes do.
On the other hands, there are so many situations, when the signed message is sensitive to the signature receiver. Signatures on medical records, tax information and most personal/business transactions are such situations. Signatures used in such situations are called directed signatures [1, 2, 3, 14, 15, 19, 23, 24] . In directed signature scheme, the signature receiver has full control over the signature verification process and can prove the validity of the signature to any third party, whenever necessary.
Nobody can check the validity of signature without his cooperation.
Many threshold signature schemes require a trusted SDC to generate the group secret keys and secret shares of group members, which have a single point of vulnerability. The existence of such a center is not a reasonable assumption; there are two potential problems.
• First, for many applications, there is no one person or devices which cab be completely trusted by all members of the group.
• Second, the use of a key center creates a single point failure. Any security lapse at the key center can reveal the private key.
To avoid these problems, in 1992, Harn introduced a scheme based on a modified ElGamal signature scheme, which does not require a trusted SDC [10] . Each member works as a SDC, generates and distributes the secret shares for each user. In this paper, we proposed a Directed -Threshold MultiSignature Scheme without SDC.
Directed -Threshold Multi -Signature Scheme without SDC
In this scheme, each shareholder works as a SDC to generate his secret key and distribute the corresponding secret shares to other shareholders. In advance, all the shareholders are agree for the public parameters. We assume that there is a designated combiner DC who takes the responsibility to collect and verify each partial signature and then produce a group signature. Nevertheless, there is no partial secret information of the other users associated with the DC.
2.1.Group Public Key and Secret Shares Generation Phase (a)
.All the members of the organization S agree to select the group public parameters p, q , g ,h and a common random secret K. (f). Each member i in G S works as SDC.He selects a random secret h ij ∈ Zq and computes the secret value l ij and public value m ij , n ij for j ≠ i, as,
(g). Each member i in G S computes a public value 
Partial Signature Generation by any t Members and Verification
If any t members of the organization out of n members agree to sign a message m for a person R. (c). Each member i ,i ∈ H S recovers his/her secret share l ji , as,
(e). Each member of H S computes his/her modified shadow
(f). Each member i ,i ∈ H S uses his/her modified shadow, i S MS and a value s i , as • R chooses random ∈ Zp computes = w. g α mod p, γ = R x mod p and sends , γ to C.
• C sends u, v to R, by which R can verify that w = (U S ) u . g v mod p.
• R sends to C, by which she can verify that
Security Discussions
In this sub-section, we shall discuss the security aspects of proposed scheme. Here we shall discuss several possible attacks and show that, none of these can successfully break the system. A forger may randomly selects an integer R R and then computes the hash value R S such that R S = h (R R , m) mod q, obviously to compute the integer S S is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem. On the other hand, the forger can randomly select R S and S S first, then try to determine a value R R that satisfies the signature verification equation. However, according to the property of the hash function h, it is quite impossible. Thus, this attack will not be successful.
Illustration
For illustration, Suppose
Group public Key and Secret Shares Generation Phase (c). R in a zero knowledge fashion proves to C that log 16 32 = log 3 25 as follows:-• C chooses random u = 13, v = 15 and computes w = 9 and sends w to R.
• C sends u, v to R, by which R can verify that w = 9.
• R sends to C, by which she can verify that = 36 and γ = 16.
Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a Directed -Threshold Multi -signature Scheme without SDC. In this scheme,
• Each shareholder works as a SDC to generate his secret key and distribute the corresponding secret shares to other shareholders.
•
There is a designated combiner DC who takes the responsibility to collect and verify each partial signature and then produce a group signature, but no secret information is associated with the DC.
• Any malicious set of signers cannot impersonate any other set of signers to forge the signatures. In case of forgery, it is possible to trace the signing set.
• Any t or more shareholders acting in collusion cannot conspire to reconstruct the group secret key by providing their own secret shares.
